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Noebes and Reed: HB 513 - Civil Practice Act: Anti-SLAPP

CIVIL PRACTICE
Civil Practice Act: Amend Article 2 of Chapter 6 of Title 5 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Appellate Practice,
so as to Revise Provisions Regarding Those Judgments and Rulings
Deemed Directly Appealable; Amend Article 3 of Chapter 11 of
Title 9 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to
Pleadings and Motions, so as to Revise Provisions Regarding the
Procedure for Claims Asserted Against a Person or Entity Arising
from an Act by that Person or Entity Which Could Reasonably Be
Construed as an Act in Furtherance of the Right of Free Speech or
the Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances;
Revise Definitions; Amend Chapter 5 of Title 51 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Libel and Slander, so as to
Revise a Cross-reference; Provide for Related Matters; Provide for
an Effective Date; Repeal Conflicting Laws; And for Other
Purposes
CODE SECTIONS:
BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER:
GEORGIA LAWS:
SUMMARY:

O.C.G.A.
§§ 5-6-34
(amended),
9-11-11.1
(amended),
51-5-7
(amended)
HB 513
420
2016 Ga. Laws 341
The Act amends Georgia’s anti-SLAPP
statute to expand its coverage from
protecting the right to petition to also
include protecting the right of free
speech in connection with an issue of
public interest or concern. Claims
brought against those involved in such
activities shall be subject to a motion to
strike, unless the court determines that
the nonmoving party has established a
probability that the claimant can
prevail on the merits. If the moving
party succeeds on a motion to strike,

109

Published by Reading Room, 2016

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 8

110

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

EFFECTIVE DATE:

[Vol. 33:1

the court will award the party
attorney’s fees and costs associated
with the motion. Any order granting or
denying a motion to strike will be
immediately appealable.
July 1, 2016

History
In 2000, Georgia Community Support & Solutions, Inc. (“GCSS”),
a nonprofit organization that assists adults with disabilities and their
families, placed Shirley Berryhill’s mentally disabled adult son with
an independently contracted caregiver. 1 In 2002, Berryhill began
posting complaints about the quality of care GCSS was providing her
son on a website for families of adults with disabilities. 2 In her
complaints, Berryhill claimed, among other things, that her son had
rapidly lost thirty-five to forty pounds, had no clothes and no bed,
had been beaten, and had become afraid to speak to family.3 In 2003,
Berryhill voiced her concerns once again in an email sent to about
forty people, including one who worked for the Atlanta Journal
Constitution, and another who worked for the Georgia Department of
Human Resources.4
Following this email, the contents of which Berryhill also posted
on the website for families of adults with disabilities, GCSS sent
Berryhill a letter demanding a retraction and apology. 5 GCSS
received neither. 6 In response, the organization filed a defamation
and tortious interference with business relationships suit against
Berryhill. 7 GCSS’s complaint alleged that Berryhill maliciously
published false information about the organization and its executive
director online.8 Berryhill countered by stating that she had made the
1. Ga. Cmty. Support & Sols., Inc. v. Berryhill, 275 Ga. App. 189, 189, 620 S.E.2d 178, 179–80
(2005), aff’d 281 Ga. 439, 638 S.E.2d 278 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 190, 620 S.E.2d at 180.
6. Id.
7. Ga. Cmty. Support & Sols., Inc., 275 Ga. App. at 190, 620 S.E.2d at 180.
8. Id. at 189, 620 S.E.2d at 179.
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statements in good faith and in the hopes that others, particularly the
Atlanta Journal Constitution and Georgia Department of Resources,
could help investigate her concerns about her son’s treatment and
“remedy such concerns, if possible.” 9 Berryhill filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that her statements fell under the protection of
Georgia’s current anti-SLAPP statute and that GCSS had failed to
comply with the statute’s verification requirements.10
“SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuit against public
participation.”11 Plaintiffs most often use SLAPP suits to stifle the
speech of adverse parties. 12 Accordingly, anti-SLAPP legislation
aims to thaw the chilling effects these suits can have on protected
free speech. 13 At the time GCSS filed its suit against Berryhill,
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute attempted to achieve this aim by
identifying protected speech and requiring potential SLAPP
claimants and their attorneys to attest to the validity of their claims
by filing a written verification.14 The verification required claimants
to certify under oath that their claims were well grounded in fact and
law, did not involve privileged communication, and were not
imposed for an improper purpose; namely to suppress a person’s
right of free speech or petition.15 If a claimant failed to sufficiently
verify the claim, the court would strike the claim. 16 If a claimant
verified his claim in violation of the statute, “the court, upon motion
or upon its initiative” would impose a sanction, which could include
dismissal of the claim or an order to pay the adverse party’s legal
expenses.17
At the time of the Berryhill suit—and until the enactment of HB
513 in 2016—Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute limited protected speech
to the following:

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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Id.
Id. at 191, 620 S.E.2d at 181.
SLAPP, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Id.
See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(a–b) (2015).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Any written or oral statement, writing, or petition made
before or to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding,
or any other official proceeding authorized by law, or any
written or oral statement, writing, or petition made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by
a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law.18
In essence, the statute narrowed protected speech to statements
made in connection with official government proceedings.19 When a
person spoke on an issue not currently under consideration or review
through an official proceeding, no anti-SLAPP protections applied.20
It is this provision that proved determinative in Georgia Community
Support & Solutions, Inc. v. Berryhill.
The trial court granted Berryhill’s motion to dismiss, finding
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute applied to her statements and that
GCSS had failed to satisfy the statute’s verification requirements
imposed by that statute, but the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed
this ruling. 21 The appellate court found that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP
statute did not apply to Berryhill’s statements because they had not
been made in connection with any official proceedings. 22 Even if
Berryhill had hoped that her speech would lead to an official
investigation of GCSS and her son’s treatment, this aspiration alone
failed to bring her statements within the narrow scope of protected
speech articulated in the anti-SLAPP statute.23 In 2006, the Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.24
Proponents of HB 513, including its sponsor, Representative Ron
Stephens (R-164th), state that citizens who speak out on issues of
public concern, like Berryhill, are among the people who will receive
protection under an expanded anti-SLAPP statute. 25 However, the
18. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c).
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Ga. Cmty. Support & Sols., 275 Ga. App. at 190, 620 S.E.2d at 180.
22. Id. at 192, 620 S.E.2d at 181–82.
23. Id.
24. Berryhill v. Ga. Cmty. Support & Sols., Inc., 281 Ga. 439, 439, 638 S.E.2d 278, 280 (2006).
25. Video Recording of House Non-Civil Judiciary Committee Meeting, Feb. 24, 2016 at 40 min.,
35 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)), http://www.house.ga.gov/Committees/enUS/CommitteeArchives146.aspx [hereinafter House Committee Video].
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true driving force behind HB 513 is the legislature’s desire to appeal
to Georgia’s booming, corporate film industry rather than a civic
concern for the free speech rights of “the little guy.”26
In large part, HB 513 was “brought to you by the film industry,”
and enjoyed strong support from the American Motion Picture
Association. 27 As Peter Canfield, a First Amendment attorney,
explained during a House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee meeting,
celebrities and the broader film industry often attract lawsuits. 28
Because of this tendency, the film industry desires a legal
environment where it can receive an early determination of these
cases on the merits without having to incur the high costs of
discovery and court proceedings for claims that turn out to be
frivolous.29 In an effort to foster this type of environment, the authors
of HB 513 modeled the bill after California’s anti-SLAPP statute,
perhaps the most expansive anti-SLAPP provision in effect in the
United States.30
Bill Tracking of HB 513
Consideration and Passage by the House
Representative Ron Stephens (R-164th) sponsored HB 513 in the
House.31 The House read the bill for the first time on March 2, 2015,
and was committed to State Planning and Community Affairs. 32
Speaker David Ralston (R-7th) withdrew the bill from State Planning
and Community Affairs and recommitted the bill to the House

26. House Committee Video, supra note 25, at 33 min., 8 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ron Stephens (R164th)).
27. Id.; Interview with Rep. Stacey Evans (D-42nd) (June 29, 2016) (expressing her concerns that
because HB 513 was heavily influenced by the film industry it is “not an anti-SLAPP bill,” and that “the
film industry and big media are [using it as] a way to reduce their fact checking time and costs”)
[hereinafter Evans Interview].
28. House Committee Video, supra note 25, at 38 min., 5 sec. (remarks by Peter Canfield, Attorney).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 35 min., 15 sec. (remarks by Peter Canfield, Attorney); U.S. Needs an Anti-SLAPP Law
like California’s, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-slapp20150816-story.html.
31. Georgia General Assembly, HB 513, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/enUS/Display/20152016/HB/513.
32. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016.
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Judiciary Non-Civil Committee. 33 The House read the bill for the
second time on March 3, 2015.34 On February 25, 2016, the House
Judiciary Non-Civil Committee amended the bill in part and
favorably reported the bill by substitute.35
The Committee substitute included most of the introduced bill’s
text, and merely removed or changed the text of a few subsections.36
The Committee substitute changed some of the language found in
Section 1 of the bill beginning at line thirty-two. 37 The language
requiring a nonmoving party to establish that “he or she would be
likely to prevail on a motion for summary judgment brought by the
moving party pursuant to Code section 9-11-35” was removed.38 In
its place, the Committee substitute stated “an issue of public interest
or concern shall be subject to a motion to strike unless the court
determines that the nonmoving party has established that there is a
probability that the nonmoving party will prevail on the claim.”39
The Committee substitute also changed the language found under
subsection (b.1) of Section 1, related to recovery of attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation. 40 Yet, like the changes above, these
changes were merely superficial and did not alter the effect of the
subsection.41 The Committee substitute also removed subsection (e),
which stated, “an order granting or denying a motion to dismiss or a
motion to strike shall be immediately appealable.” 42 Finally, the
Committee substitute removed some of the language found in Section
3 of the bill so that it stated, “[t]his Act shall become effective on
July 1, 2016.”43

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Compare HB 513, as introduced, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513 (HCS), 2016 Ga. Gen.
Assemb.
37. Id.
38. HB 513, as introduced, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
39. HB 513 (HCS), § 1, p. 2, ll. 30–33, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
40. HB 513, as introduced, § 1, pp. 2–3, ll. 61–65, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
41. Compare HB 513, as introduced, § 1, pp. 2–3, ll. 61–65, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513
(HCS), § 1, pp. 2–3, ll. 61–68, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
42. Compare HB 513, as introduced, § 1, p. 3, ll. 86–87, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513
(HCS), 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
43. Compare HB 513, as introduced, § 3, p. 4, ll. 106–07, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513
(HCS), § 3, p. 4, l. 106, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
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The House read the bill for the third time on February 29, 2016.44
Representative Evans (D-42nd) offered a floor amendment that
deleted “to revise definitions” on line 5 and replaced lines 17 through
104 of the Committee substitute with alternate text. 45 This
amendment sought to remove the requirement that a nonmoving
party must establish a probability of prevailing on a claim, which
would ultimately remove the requirement that a plaintiff show actual
malice in order to defeat a defendant’s motion to strike. 46
Representatives in the House objected to Representative Evans’s
floor amendment, and it was not adopted after losing a vote 71 to
98. 47 The House passed the Committee substitute of HB 513 on
February 29, 2016, by a vote of 131 to 41.48
Consideration and Passage by the Senate
Senator Charlie Bethel (R-54th) sponsored HB 513 in the Senate.49
The Senate first read HB 513 on March 2, 2016. 50 HB 513 was
assigned to the Senate Committee on Economic Development and
Tourism, which made a number of amendments to the bill.51
The Senate Committee added back into the bill language to address
how and where anti-SLAPP cases may be appealed.52 The Committee
revised subsection (a) of Code section 5-6-34, relating to judgments
and rulings deemed directly appealable, adding “all judgments or
orders entered pursuant to [the anti-SLAPP statute]” may be appealed
to the Georgia Supreme Court or Court of Appeals.53

44. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016.
45. Failed House Floor Amendment to HB 513, introduced by Rep. Stacey Evans (D-42nd), Feb. 29,
2016.
46. Id.; Video Recording of House Proceedings, Feb. 29, 2016 at 56 mins. (remarks by Rep. Stacey
Evans (D-42nd)), http://www.gpb.org/lawmakers/2016/day-30 [hereinafter House Floor Vote Video].
47. House Floor Vote Video, supra note 45. at 1 hr., 3 mins., 32 sec. (remarks by Speaker David
Ralston (R-7th)).
48. Id. at 1 hr., 4 mins., 27 sec. (remarks by Speaker David Ralston (R-7th)).
49. See Georgia General Assembly, HB 513, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/enUS/Display/20152016/HB/513
50. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016.
51. Id.; Compare HB 513 (HCS), 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513 (SCS), 2016 Ga. Gen.
Assemb.
52. HB 513 (SCS), § 1, p. 1, ll. 12–45, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
53. HB 513 (SCS), § 1, p. 2, ln. 45, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
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In Section 2, the Committee also made some revisions to Code
section 9-11-11.1. 54 First, under subsection (b)(2), the Committee
added language to provide for cases where “the nonmoving party is a
public figure plaintiff,” allowing such nonmoving party “discovery
on the sole issue of actual malice.”55 Second, the Committee revised
the bill to ensure that entities, as well as persons, have the right of
petition or free speech, and included “any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
concern” to the list of recognized acts in furtherance of this right.56
Finally, the Committee updated cross-references to maintain
consistency.57
The Senate Committee on Economic Development and Tourism
favorably reported the bill by substitute on March 11, 2016.58 The
Senate read the bill for the second time on March 14, 2016, and for
the third time on March 16, 2016. 59 No Senate floor amendments
were introduced, and on March 16, 2016, the Senate passed the
Committee substitute of HB 513 without objection by a vote of 50 to
2.60
The Senate transmitted the bill to the House on March 22, 2016.61
The House agreed to the Senate’s version of the bill, as amended, on
the same day, by a vote of 117 to 45.62 The House sent the bill to
Governor Nathan Deal (R) on March 29, 2016; the Governor signed
the bill into law on April 26, 2016, and the bill became effective on
July 1, 2016.63

54. HB 513 (SCS), § 2, pp. 2–5, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
55. HB 513 (SCS), § 2, p. 3, ll. 88–93, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
56. HB 513 (SCS), § 2, p. 4, ll. 108–13, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
57. HB 513 (SCS) § 2, p. 4, ll. 128–29, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
58. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016.
59. Id.
60. Video Recording of Senate Proceedings, March 16, 2016 at 5 mins., 50 sec. (remarks by LG
Casey Cagle), http://www.gpb.org/lawmakers/2016/day-38.; id. at 7 mins., 10 sec. (remarks by LG
Cagle).
61. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016.
62. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 513 (Mar. 22, 2016).
63. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016.
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The Act
The Act amends the following portions of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated: Article 2 of Chapter 6 of Title 5, relating to
appellate practice; Article 3 of Chapter 11 of Title 9, relating to
pleadings and motions; and Chapter 5 of Title 51, relating to libel and
slander. 64 The overall purpose of the Act is to encourage citizens’
participation in matters of public interest by deterring lawsuits
brought primarily for the purpose of chilling people’s and entities’
constitutional rights of petition and free speech.65
Section 1
Section 1 of the Act revises subsection (a) of Code section 5-6-34,
which provides a list of judgments and orders deemed directly
appealable.66 The Act maintains all of the original language of the
Code section, and simply adds to the existing list of directly
appealable judgments, “all judgments or orders entered pursuant to
Code section 9-11-11.1.”67
Section 2
Section 2 of the Act amends Code section 9-11-11.1, which relates
to exercising the rights of free speech and petition, legislative
findings, verification of claims, definitions, procedure on motions,
exception, and legal fees and expenses.68 Specifically, the Act makes
two significant substantive changes to Georgia’s anti-SLAPP
statute. 69 First, the Act creates a new procedural mechanism for
defendants to request an early determination of potential SLAPP suits
on the merits. 70 Second, the Act broadens the scope of first
64. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, §§ 1–5, at 341–44.
65. Id.
66. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 1, at 341–42.
67. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(13) (Supp. 2016).
68. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 342–43.
69. Aside from these substantive changes, the Act also replaces the phrase “the right to petition
government for a redress of grievances” with simply, the ‘right of petition” throughout Code section
9-11-11.1. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 342–44.
70. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b) (Supp. 2016).
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amendment activities protected under the statute to include all speech
and conduct occurring “in connection with an issue of public interest
or concern.”71
The new language of subsection (b)(1) provides that potential
SLAPP claims “shall be subject to a motion to strike unless the court
determines the nonmoving party has established that there is a
probability that the nonmoving party will prevail on the claim.” 72
This means that upon a defendant’s motion to strike, the court will
make an early determination of the plaintiff’s potential SLAPP
claims on the merits. 73 Subsection (b)(2) outlines what the court
should consider in evaluating these claims, and subsection (b)(3)
provides that once the court reaches a determination on the merits,
“neither that determination nor the fact of such determination shall be
admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case.”74
The Act also adds subsection (b.1), which requires the court to
award attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to the SLAPP defendant
on a successful motion to strike.75 Subsection (b.1) further provides
that the court must award attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to
the nonmoving party, the SLAPP plaintiff, should the court find that
the motion to strike is frivolous or solely filed to cause delay.76 After
the court decides the motion to dismiss or motion to strike, either
party can directly appeal the order in accordance with subsection (a)
of Code section 5-6-34 as amended by Section 1 of the Act.77
In addition to these procedural changes, the Act expands the scope
of activities afforded anti-SLAPP protection under Code section
9-11-11.1.78 Subsection (c) defines the term, “act in furtherance of
the person’s or entity’s right of petition or free speech under the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of
Georgia in connection with an issue of public or concern.”79 The Act
adds subsections (c)(3) to Code section 9-11-11.1 to expand the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1).
See id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(2)–(3).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b.1).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(e); 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 344.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c).
Id.
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definition of protected acts to include “any written or oral statement
or writing or petition made in a place open to the public or in a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest or concern.”80
Similarly, subsection (c)(4) adds to the definition of protected acts,
“any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional
right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public concern.”81 These additions effectively extend antiSLAPP protection to any speech or conduct connected to issues of
public concern, regardless of whether those issues are the subject of a
government proceeding.82
Finally, the Act adds subsection (e) to Code section 9-11-11.1.83
Subsection (e) provides that Code section 9-11-11.1 “shall not apply
to any action brought by the Attorney General or a prosecuting
attorney, or a city attorney acting as a prosecutor, to enforce laws
aimed at public protection.”84
Section 3
Section 3 of the Act revises paragraph (4) of Code section 51-5-7,
which provides a list of communications deemed privileged under
Georgia’s libel and slander laws. 85 In keeping with changes made
throughout Section 2, the Act removes the phrase “the right to
petition government for a redress of grievances” and replaces it with
a “person’s or entity’s right of petition.”86
Analysis
The Expansion of Georgia’s Anti-SLAPP Protections
Representative Stephens (R-164th), at the behest of Georgia’s
growing film industry, introduced the Act to curb frivolous lawsuits
designed to stifle free speech by bogging defendants down with
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c)(3).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c)(4).
2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 343.
2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 344.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(e).
2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 344.
Id.
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costly litigation. 87 The Act attempts to achieve this goal by
significantly expanding the scope of claims qualifying for antiSLAPP protection and placing an increased burden on SLAPP
plaintiffs to provide support for their claims.
Prior to the Act, Code section 9-11-11.1 limited the definition of
protectable acts to speech or petition made either during a
government proceeding or in connection with an issue under
consideration in a government proceeding.88 For example, if a citizen
raised a general concern about a predatory payday loan business,
unconnected to an ongoing official proceeding, her complaint would
fall outside the statute’s definition of protected speech. On the other
hand, if a citizen asserted the same complaint in a statement
expressing support for a bill that imposed new restrictions on payday
lenders, her statement would qualify for anti-SLAPP protection. The
Act eliminates this inconsistency by applying anti-SLAPP protection
to almost any claim arising out of speech or conduct connected to an
issue of public concern, regardless of whether those issues are the
subject of a government proceeding.89
The Act also creates a brand new procedural mechanism for
defendants to challenge SLAPP claims. Prior to the Act, Georgia
guarded against SLAPP suits by requiring plaintiffs to file a written
verification certifying that their claims were well supported in fact
and law and not filed for an improper purpose, such as suppressing
free speech. 90 The Act eliminates the verification requirement and
replaces it with a procedure that requires plaintiffs to demonstrate,
rather than certify, that their claims are meritorious.91 This places an
increased burden on plaintiffs to prove to the validity of their claims
early in litigation, even without the benefit of extensive discovery.92
Representative Evans, the Act’s most vocal critic, believes this
increased burden may result in the new law being abused.93 There is,

87. House Committee Video, supra note 25, at 33 min., 8 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ron Stephens (R164th)).
88. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 342–44.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 342–44.
93. See Evans Interview, supra note 27.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss1/8

12

Noebes and Reed: HB 513 - Civil Practice Act: Anti-SLAPP

2016]

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

121

however, no data showing systematic abuse of anti-SLAPP statutes at
either the trial or appellate levels.94
Applying Georgia’s Anti-SLAPP Provisions in Federal Courts
The federal circuits take divided positions on whether Georgia’s,
or other states’, anti-SLAPP provisions apply to claims asserted in
federal courts. 95 The issue creating the divide is uncertainty over
whether anti-SLAPP provisions are substantive or procedural in
nature. 96 As a general rule, federal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction must apply state substantive law to resolve state law
claims, but need not apply state laws that are merely procedural.97
When a procedural state law conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the federal rules control.98Anti-SLAPP provisions create
an interesting case because these laws “create procedural means to
accomplish substantive policy objectives.”99
Prior to passing HB 513, the Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia’s
anti-SLAPP law could not be applied in federal court because it was
procedural in nature and its verification requirements conflicted with
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.100 Rule 11 states
that “a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an
affidavit.”101 HB 513 eliminated the verification requirements from
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP law, thus reopening the possibility that it
could apply in federal court. However, the applicability of Georgia’s
new provisions to federal cases is not guaranteed. Georgia’s revised
anti-SLAPP provision, specifically its creation of a special motion to

94. See Felix Shafir & Jeremy B. Rosen, California’s Anti-SLAPP Law is Not Systematically
Abused, LAW360 (June 30, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/812761/california-s-anti-slapp-lawis-not-systematically-abused.
95. Hamp Watson, An Erie Split: Anti-Slapp Laws, Rule 12, and Rule 56, SUNDAY SPLITS (Sept. 25,
2013), http://sundaysplits.com/2016/09/25/an-erie-split-anti-slapp-laws-rule-12-and-rule-56/; Roni A.
Elias, Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws in Diversity Cases: How to Protect the Substantive Public Interest in
State Procedural Rules, 41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 215–16 (2016).
96. Watson, supra note 95.
97. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965).
98. Id. at 473; Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001).
99. Elias, supra note 95, at 215.
100. PRACTICALLAW, State Anti-SLAPP Statute Does Not Apply in Federal Court: Eleventh Circuit
(Jul. 14, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/5-574-4446?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
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strike, creates potential conflicts with Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56.102
Neither the substantive or procedural nature of anti-SLAPP
provisions, nor the narrower issue of whether functions like special
motions to strike conflict with the Federal Rules have reached the
Supreme Court.103
Evaluating the Strength of HB 513
The Public Participation Project (“PPP”) is a non-profit
organization focused on passing federal anti-SLAPP legislation. 104
PPP also works with groups seeking to pass anti-SLAPP legislation
at the state level.105 One of its projects includes documenting states’
anti-SLAPP laws and related judicial decisions. 106 As of the
organization’s 2015 updates, twenty-eight states have some form of
an anti-SLAPP statute.107 However, the scope of these statutes and
the procedures used to combat the chilling effects of SLAPP suits
vary widely.108 Of the states with some form of anti-SLAPP statute, a
majority limit anti-SLAPP protection to statements made in
connection with government proceedings or with the purpose of
encouraging government action.109 Roughly a third go as far as the
Act in expanding protection to any speech or conduct addressing an
issue of public concern, regardless of whether the action has a direct
connection to government action or review.110
The expansive language in the Act closely mirrors that found in
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16.111 In addition to
borrowing the broad definition of a protectable “act in furtherance of
a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or
102. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Fed. §
4509 (3d ed. 2016). See e.g., U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963,
972 (9th Cir. 1999).
103. See Watson, supra note 95.
104. About, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/about/staff/ (last visited Jun.
26, 2016).
105. Id.
106. State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/yourstates-free-speech-protection/ (last visited Jun. 26, 2016).
107. Id.
108. See generally id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Compare O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (Supp. 2016), with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16 (2016).
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California Constitution in connection with a public issue,” from the
California Code, the Georgia Act also adopts California’s procedural
enforcement mechanisms: early determination of potential SLAPP
claims on the merits via a motion to strike, and a fee shifting
provision awarding attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing
party.112
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is often cited as one of the
strongest in the nation. 113 Thus, by adopting the most substantive
provisions of California’s statute nearly word for word, the Act
stands to put Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute in the same echelon. In
fact, the Act may actually result in Georgia having an even stronger
anti-SLAPP provision than California by omitting some of the
limitations imposed by other sections of the California Code of Civil
Procedure. 114 Most notably, California passed Senate Bill 515,
codified as Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. Section 425.17, in 2003, in an effort
to roll back some of the anti-SLAPP provisions of Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code. Section 425.16.115 Section 425.17 explicitly responds to what
the California Legislature described as the “disturbing abuse” of
Section 425.16’s anti-SLAPP provisions. 116 Specifically, the
California legislature wanted to curb use of the anti-SLAPP statute
against public-interest plaintiffs.117The statute addresses the problem
by excepting some public interest actions, and certain actions arising
from commercial speech or conduct from Section 425.16’s
protections.118 Georgia’s Act contains no similar limitations.119

112. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16(b)-(c).
113. U.S. Needs an Anti-SLAPP Law like California’s, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-slapp-20150816-story.html.
114. Compare O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16 and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code.
§ 425.17 (2016).
115. Jonathan Segel, Anti-SLAPP Law Make Benefit for Glorious Entertainment Industry of America:
Borat, Reality Bites, and the Construction of an Anti-SLAPP Fence Around the First Amendment, 26
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 639, 652 (2009).
116. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16(a).
117. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.17(b).
118. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.17(b)-(c).
119. See generally O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (Supp. 2016); see also Evans Interview, supra note 27.

Published by Reading Room, 2016

15

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 8

124

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

Constitutional Considerations
The Act creates potential First Amendment, Seventh Amendment,
and Fourteenth Amendment issues.120 First, the Act may be construed
as limiting plaintiffs’ rights of petition by denying them an
opportunity to fully pursue claims involving speech protected by the
anti-SLAPP provisions. 121 The Act does not directly address this
concern, but the same limitations have been challenged in the
California courts.122
In Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, a
SLAPP plaintiff asserted that “section 425.16 violate[d] her First
Amendment rights to petition and access the courts because it
impose[d] a penalty and ‘liability for fees’ without requiring a
showing that the suit is objectively frivolous.” 123 The California
Appellate court rejected the argument and reasoned that “[t]he right
to petition is not absolute, providing little or no protection for
baseless litigation.”124
The California Courts have also dealt with due process and equal
protection concerns arising out of the state’s anti-SLAPP statute.125
In Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., a SLAPP
plaintiff argued that California’s anti-SLAPP statute limited its
access to the judicial system, thus violating equal protection.126 The
plaintiff further asserted “the combined effect of the [statute’s]
discovery stay and 30-day [motion to strike] hearing requirement
violated its due process rights because it was unable to defend
adequately the motion to strike.” 127 Addressing the Due Process
arguments, the court reasoned that the anti-SLAPP statute’s
discovery stay did not violate a plaintiff’s due process rights because
it did not preclude the court from ordering additional discovery
before hearing a motion to strike if it deemed such discovery
120. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1; see also Evans Interview, supra note 27.
121. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b).
122. See, e.g., Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 115 Cal. App. 4th 322 (Cal. App. 4th
Dist. 2004).
123. Bernardo, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 360.
124. Id. at 358 (quoting Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 64 (2002)).
125. See Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
1995).
126. Id. at 865.
127. Id. at 865–67.
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necessary. 128 Courts in Georgia retain similar discretion regarding
discovery under the Act.129 The Act’s discovery stay and thirty-day
hearing requirements, although default procedures, are not
mandatory.130 Subsection (d) of Code section 9-11-11.1 provides that
“[t]he court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order
that specified discovery or other hearings or motions be
conducted.”131
The Lafayette court further held that the anti-SLAPP procedures
did not violate equal protection rights because the statute’s early
determination procedures were “rationally related” to the California
Legislature’s valid government interests: encouraging public
participation in matters of public significance and discouraging suits
seeking to chill the valid exercise of First Amendment rights. 132
Georgia applies the same “rational basis” standard to equal protection
claims involving state statutes, making a similar result possible if the
Act faced an equal protection challenge in the future.133
Despite the existence of several California decisions upholding the
constitutionality of anti-SLAPP legislation, not all courts have
reached the same conclusions. Most notably, the Washington
Supreme Court recently deemed its state’s anti-SLAPP statute as
unconstitutional because it required trial judges to adjudicate factual
questions without a trial, thus violating the plaintiff’s right to a jury
trial under the state constitution.134
Georgia Courts will likely have to deal with similar issues in the
future. In particular, courts, litigators, and the General Assembly
alike, should all look out for the types of abuse warned about by
Representative Evans and already addressed by the California
legislature. To avoid such abuse, the General Assembly may need to
consider mirroring California’s law once again, and except certain
types of public-interest actions from the burdensome anti-SLAPP
128. Id. at 868.
129. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(d) (Supp. 2016)
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Lafayette Morehouse, Inc., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 865.
133. See Henry v. State, 263 Ga. 417, 418, 434 S.E.2d 469, 471 (1993) (“[S]tatutory classifications
are presumed valid and will survive an equal protection challenge if the classification bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest.”).
134. Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 864 (Wash. 2015).
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procedure. In addition, Courts can help the Act to function effectively
by using the discretion regarding discovery and hearings that the Act
affords. By exercising discretion, rather than indiscriminately
applying the Act’s default procedures, courts can help to ensure that
the free speech rights of defendants, especially powerful business
defendants, do not receive protection by wrongfully limiting the
constitutional rights of plaintiffs.
Pierre-Joseph Noebes & Rachael Reed
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